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INTRODUCTION

The nondelegation doctrine is one of American constitutional law's
peculiarities: Judges of all ideological stripes describe it as fundamental to
our constitutional system of government, but very few judges can-or
will -readily apply it to invalidate an act of Congress. It has become a
popular punch line among professors of constitutional and administrative
law since it has only had "one good year, and 211 bad ones" in the
Supreme Court.' Given the rise of the twentieth-century administrative
state and numerous concomitant grants of authority from Congress, is it not
strange that not a single statute has elicited so much as a nondelegationbased whimper, much less a roar, from the Supreme Court? Additionally,
it seems quite unlikely that administrative governance is due for any sort of
serious reconsideration. If delegation of government power is occurring
within the present administrative framework, does anyone realistically
believe it will slow down in the near future?
Reams of literature have pondered this apparent paradox, either
praising or criticizing the Court's apparent reticence to enforce
nondelegation. Some scholars, for example, have answered by declaring the
2
nondelegation doctrine dead and happily performing a jig upon its grave.
Another suggests that the nondelegation doctrine has retreated into various
tools of statutory construction, thus confirming that the Court is enforcing
nondelegation in a real, not ham-handed sort of way, albeit indirectly.3
Another even suggests that the tangible benefits of the administrative state
and apparent public acceptance of it render a robust nondelegation
doctrine a countermajoritarian judicial hot potato.4 On the other hand,
there are a few wilderness-wandering souls who yearn for nondelegation to
be more strictly enforced, if for no reason other than the hope that more
accountability would actually result in better regulation.5 But, despite the
author's more primal desire to criticize government by administrative

1. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1721-23 (2002). Not to mention grousing about its zombie-like ability to
be revived in scholarly circles.
3. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 315-16 (arguing the nondelegation doctrine is
enforced through canons of construction rather than directly as an independent doctrine).
4. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 81, 81-82 (1985).
5. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY ix-x (1993); cf
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1232-33
(1994) (expressing frustration that no one seems to want to prod the federal government into
less regulation).
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bureaucracy, perhaps there is a more useful and appropriate question
lurking just beneath the surface: Is there something missing from the
current doctrine that makes its enforcement so difficult? Better yet, could
the discovery of this constitutional and administrative law MacGuffin 6 be
the key to unlocking a more robust, or at least comprehensive,
nondelegation doctrine?
The question of positive law (can the nondelegation doctrine be enforced
judicially in any realistic manner?) is perhaps even more interesting than
the question of whether it should be enforced at all.7 Therefore, I do not
propose here to pluck nary a pebble from the vast stone castle of the
American administrative branch-to do so is at once impossible and
perhaps even undesirable. I simply appreciate seeing a court apply a
coherent rule for drawing the line between legislative authority and
executive (or judicial) 8 authority. To that end, this Article argues that the
traditional, "intelligible principle" nondelegation analysis is incomplete and
that an examination of the delegate, rather than just the delegation, more
effectively animates the doctrine. This is true not only as a practical matter;
early Supreme Court cases, as well as later ones, have taken a keen interest
in the recipient of the alleged delegation. In other words, a realistic and
judicially enforceable nondelegation doctrine must include more than a
mere tip of the juridical cap.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I will discuss the constitutional
nondelegation principle, lay out fundamental principles of accountability,
and propose that the courts should enforce nondelegation through a more
complete analysis of the delegate, instead of only the traditional intelligible
principle analysis. Part II will discuss, in more detail, the normative
judgments underlying the fundamental principles discussed in Part II. Part
III combines the classical intelligible principle doctrine with the new
institutional nature paradigm and proposes an analysis of the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC). The proposed test measures not only whether
Congress has articulated an intelligible principle, but also whether Congress
has intelligibly directed an improper delegate to exercise legislative power.

6. The term "MacGuffin" refers to a plot device used in cinema. It is a physical
object within the story that serves as the driving force of the plot, but its literal identity does
not matter. See DONALD SPOTO, THE ART OF ALFRED HITCHCOCK xi (First Anchor Books
ed. 1992) (1976). For example, the plot arc of The Maltese Falcon likely would not change if it
were a Burmese Pigeon instead.
7. See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 81-82.
8. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405, 405-06 (2008).
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF NONDELEGATION AND THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

The constitutional nondelegation principle flows from another
fundamental principle: separation of powers.9 The Constitution vests
Congress-and Congress alone-with "[a]ll legislative Powers" of the
United States.' 0 The Court has long interpreted the Constitution to
prohibit Congress from delegating its vested legislative authority." The
principle itself is fairly straightforward: legislators alone have the authority
to enact binding statutes containing policy preferences, but conferring
discretion for execution of a given law is both acceptable and necessary in
giving effect to those preferences.1 2 It should be rather apparent that this
paradigm is limited in its helpfulness. Determining whether a given act of
Congress crosses this apparent line is thought to consist of answering a
single question: has Congress provided an "intelligible principle" for the
implementation of the statute?" Unless the court determines that Congress
has "failed to articulate any policy or standard that would serve to confine
the discretion" of the delegate, the nondelegation doctrine as it exists today
is satisfied.1 4 As a practical matter, courts applying this test have very rarely
held any act of Congress unconstitutional for lack of an intelligible
principle.' 5 Part I describes these fundamental nondelegation principles
and discusses how the intelligible principle doctrine is limited in serving
those principles. Furthermore, it will discuss how an examination of the
institutional nature of the delegate serves those principles better and is
grounded in the Court's nondelegation jurisprudence.
A. The ConstitutionalPinciple ofNondelegation
Separation of powers has long been understood as a feature fundamental
to our constitutional system of government.' 6 Indeed, separation of powers
may be considered fundamental to western theories of statecraft stretching
back centuries. The principle is often attributed, at least in part, to Baron
de Montesquieu, who wrote, "When the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can
be no liberty."' 7 Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution provides, "All
9. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
11. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
12. J.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928).
13. Id. at 409.
14. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 371.
17.

BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 163 (Thomas Nugent, trans.
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legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States."' 8 Since the Constitution emerged from the heated crucible
of the American Revolution, this has been understood to mean that
Congress cannot delegate its specific, constitutionally-vested authority to
another entity.1 9 After all, what is the benefit of separating powers if one
branch, or even one person, could simply meld them back together?
Indeed, "that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is
a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." 20
The very concept of separation of powers is involved intimately with
"checks and balances," the notion that dividing powers limits the aggregate
power of government over the governed. 2' The nondelegation principle
could be said, perhaps, to lie in the space between separation of powers and
checks-and-balances. It maintains the separation of powers by prohibiting
delegation, thus simultaneously vindicating the elegant theory of checksand-balances through prohibiting the entities to be checked and balanced
from circumventing them.
More important, perhaps, than separation of powers and checks-andbalances, is accountability. If any branch of government delegates its
authority, the system of accountability contemplated by the democratic
process would also be frustrated.
In sum, it can be said that the
nondelegation doctrine represents and combines three fundamental
principles: democratic accountability for legislators and the President, interbranch accountability for executive and administrative action, and
limitation on government power through checks-and-balances.
As important as the nondelegation principle appears in theory, applying
it in practice is frustrating. Even the most strident advocates for strict
separation of powers and limited government must recognize that
"legislative" does not lend itself to a simple definition.
Obviously,
legislation reflects policy preferences. And, obviously, legislative power is
much wider than executive power or judicial power. Despite the fact that
Congress seems to have broad authority to select among many policy
choices, "legislative" does not precisely equal "discretionary." 22 In practice,
the other branches of government can and must exercise a measure of
discretion when properly exercising their own functions, whether acting

1752) (1748).
18.
19.
scheme
20.
21.
22.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
See Lawson, supra note 5, at 1237-38, (describing the Constitution's tripartite
of government and nondelegation's place within that scheme).
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
See Lemos, supra note 8, at 411.
Lawson, supra note 5, at 1239.
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pursuant to a legislative directive or in their various spheres of independent
authority.2 3 Given this unavoidable discretion, courts have attempted for
years to give effect to the nondelegation principle by inquiring whether any
given congressional act is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority and necessary discretion in executing or adjudicating upon
Congress's legislative pronouncements. 24 As such, accountability for
legislative judgments properly lies with Congress, consisting of the people's
elected representatives, and accountability for executive judgments properly
lies with the President, who also serves at the pleasure of the electorate.
That line-drawing exercise has resulted only in the half-hearted
development of the incomplete intelligible principle analysis, which is the
lone component of the modern nondelegation doctrine.
Despite never utilizing the insight formally, the Court has at times
pondered who was sitting on the receiving end of a congressional directive.25
Because this analysis has never been developed outside circumstances
where the intelligible principle was not met 26 or outside a dissenting
opinion,27 courts inconsistently consider who is receiving the delegation.
Not only can critical evaluation of the delegate add a useful and discrete
component to the doctrine, but it can also inform and enrich the intelligible
principle analysis to which it will be yoked. With this in mind, I turn to the
well-known, but perhaps less well-understood, intelligible principle
doctrine.
B. ClassicalIntelligible Pinciple Nondelegation
First-year constitutional law students learn the nondelegation doctrine in
reference to little more than the intelligible principle doctrine. This is
reasonable, of course, because the overwhelming majority of the Court's
nondelegation cases appear to rest solely on this idea. Fundamentally, the
intelligible principle doctrine is a rough judicial approximation of an
improper delegation.
To the early courts grappling with this idea, an
obviously improper delegation might be a statute that said simply: go forth
and make the world a better place. To understand this, we must keep in
mind that the mighty administrative oak we know today was but a seed.

.

23. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A
certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial
action ...
24. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 650 (1892).
25. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(discussing delegation to nongovernmental industry groups); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 427
(Scalia,J., dissenting) (comparing delegation to "a sort of junior-varsity Congress").
26. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 500.
27. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413-27 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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Perhaps it seemed sufficient to those early courts merely to read the actual
congressional direction and determine whether it was clear enough to avoid
leaving too much discretion with the delegate. Furthermore, the vast
majority of early alleged delegations were to one person: the President. As
such, the Court rarely had the occasion to even consider who was on the
receiving end of Congress's instructions because it was always just the
President. The earliest of the nondelegation precedents are representative
of this theme.
One of the earliest traces of nondelegation is Field v. Clark.28 In Clark, a
group of merchants sued the government over tariffs assessed on goods they
sought to import.2 9 The statute in question authorized the President to
decide whether and when to enforce various tariffs on certain goods.30 The
Court reasoned that this exercise of discretion was permitted because the
legislation directed the President to activate or not to activate a certain set
of tariffs based upon what facts he found to exist at any given time.3
Because "nothing involving the expediency or the just operation of such
legislation was left to the determination of the President," there was no
breach of the nondelegation principle.32 In support of its position, the Clark
Court cited Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of

Clinton County,33 the Ohio Supreme Court case laying out the basic,
theoretical underpinning of the nondelegation doctrine:
The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and

conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made. 34
The Clark Court clearly did not think it was dealing with an unfamiliar
exercise of legislative and executive power in concert, as it painstakingly
listed the contents of several other tariff and customs statutes that operated
similarly to the challenged statute.35 Perhaps like the dichotomy of fact and
law, the former being the province of the jury and the latter of the judge,
legislative and executive power should be seen as inextricably linked. In
Clark, the President was to survey the economic scene, evaluate the

28.
29.
30.
31.
this, but
32.
33.
34.
35.

See 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 662-67.
Id. at 680-81. In truth, the statutory scheme was somewhat more complicated than
this is the basic idea.
Id. at 693.
1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
Id. at 88-89.
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 682-83 (1892).
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evidence, and make findings of fact. 36 He then referred to the authorizing
legislation to determine whether Congress desired a tariff based upon the
facts he had just ascertained.37 If this was to be the working framework of
the nondelegation doctrine, the Clark Court could have done worse.
Continuing in the world of customs duties and trade protection, the next
whisper of nondelegation surfaced in 1928 with W Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States.38 The facts in Hampton were quite similar to those in Clark:
Congress had authorized a set of tariffs to be activated-or not activatedwhen certain conditions were found to exist.39 This time, however,
Congress had set forth a procedure whereby a United States Tariff
Commission (Tariff Commission) would investigate the conditions on
behalf of the President, who would proclaim whether or not the tariff
activated based upon its findings. 40 The Hampton Court subsequently had
no trouble quickly disposing of the claim that Congress had unlawfully
delegated any legislative authority to the President or the Tariff
Commission; in doing so, the Court wrote the words that would become
the basis for the doctrine as it exists today: "If Congress shall lay down by
legislative act an intelligibleprinciple to which the person or body authorized
to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power."41 Clark and Hampton illustrate
that the Court was not concerned about alleged delegations to the
President, or even to a committee that delivered its fact-finding to him
directly. It might be said that an intelligible principle leaves Congress
accountable for legislative judgments, while the President-the clear
delegate-could be held accountable for executive judgments. Or, each
could be held accountable for the entire affair if the people disliked the
results. Furthermore, in this simple scenario, each branch was limited in its
overall exercise of power. That is, a Congress utilizing an intelligible
principle could not delegate to the President unlimited power, nor could
the President utilize vast power on his own claiming that Congress had
authorized him such power through a broad delegation.
By 1935, the nondelegation doctrine had many times played the role of
the hapless Washington Generals, 42 having never defeated an act of

J7.

36. Id. at 656-61.
37. Id.
38. 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928).
39. Id. at 400.
40. Id. at 402.
41. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
42. The Washington Generals were the team that traveled with and "competed"
against the famous Harlem Globetrotters exhibition basketball team. The Generals defeated
the Globetrotters only once, in 197 1. See Rodger Sherman, A Requiem for the Washington
Generals, the Worst Sports Team of All
ime, SBNATION (Aug. 14, 2015, 10:24 AM),
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Congress. But the New Deal era represented a shift in the way the federal
government perceived its role in regulating the nation's economic and
industrial affairs. Furthermore, the architects of the New Deal were also
the architects of what would become the vast bureaucracy that exists
today. 43 The New Deal, unsurprisingly then, brought with it a flurry of
legislation designed to change the way industry and the economy were
regulated. One of the first and most comprehensive acts of the New Deal
was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which authorized the
president to promulgate Codes of Fair Competition for a large number of
industries. 44 The mechanics of the promulgation of these codes were fairly
straightforward: trade groups or other industry associations could cooperate
with federal and state agencies and unions to create codes for their
industries and submit them for approval by the President. 45 In 1933,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved and enacted by Executive Order
the Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, promulgated
under § 9(c) of NIRA.46
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 47 the Supreme Court took occasion to
determine whether the authority Congress intended the President to
exercise under NIRA, with respect to permitting or prohibiting flows of oil,
violated the nondelegation doctrine. 48 The Court began by examining
§ 9(c), the provision in question. The section authorized the President to
stop the flow of oil in interstate or foreign commerce to the extent that
amount of oil exceeded the amount permitted by any state or state
agency. 49 The Court had the following to say about § 9(c):
Section 9(c) does not state whether, or in what circumstances or under what
conditions, the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of
petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the State's
permission.... It does not require any finding by the President as a
condition of his action.

. .

. So far as this section is concerned, it gives to the

President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.50
Clearly, the Court was looking for some specific "magic words" when it was

http://www.sbnation.com/2015/8/14/9152971 /washington-generals-harlemglobetrotters-losing-all-the-time).
43. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (Yale Univ. Press 7th
prtg. 1966) (1938).
44. Pub. L. No. 73-67 §§ 3(a)-(b), 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933).
45. Id.
46. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 408-09 n.3 (1935).
47. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
48. Id. at 414-15.
49. Id. at 406.
50. Id. at 415.
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applying the nondelegation doctrine to the facts presented in Panama
Refining. It is not clear that the Court believed it was doing anything more
than applying the classical intelligible principle nondelegation doctrine that
had come of age through Clark, Hampton, and the other early nondelegation
cases. In all of those cases, the Court had allowed the President broad
discretion in the methods or regulations used to determine whether to
permit various imports,5 ' the Secretary of Agriculture broad discretion to
determine the appropriate methods to keep the national parks in good
condition,52 and the Federal Radio Commission broad discretion to
"equitably" allocate the different frequencies of the electromagnetic
spectrum. 53
In Panama Refining, the Court determined that Congress was attempting
to authorize the President to set his own terms for permitting or prohibiting
the flow of oil, rather than just doing so under conditions prescribed by
Congress. 54 Instead of finding facts and then applying the law set forth by
Congress, the President was now finding facts and then making law based
upon the facts found. In many ways, PanamaRefining was very similar to its
predecessor decisions: Congress wanted the President to undertake certain
actions under certain circumstances. 55 The problem with Section 9(c) was
that there were no conditions or guideposts under which the President
could permit or prohibit the distribution of petroleum. 56 Congress had left
out the conditions under which its solution to the problem of falling prices of
oil should be given effect, thereby improperly delegating the determination
of which conditions should exist rather than allowing discretion to determine that
certain conditions exist. Since making these determinations is the essence of
legislative power, the Court held that § 9(c) lacked an intelligible principle
and, therefore, violated the nondelegation doctrine.5 7 Though the Court
did not delve deeply into the analysis, notice the effect of these rules on
accountability. Congress, having exempted itself completely from any duty
of draftsmanship, could no longer be accountable for any legislative
judgment. Instead, Congress unnecessarily enlarged the power of the
President by delegating to him Congress's almost unlimited legislative
power to regulate oil production and prices. Accountability was gone,
separation of powers was gone, and checks-and-balances were gone. The

51.
52.
53.
(1933).
54.
55.
56.
57.

SeeJ.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
See Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429-30.
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nondelegation doctrine, it can be said, was deployed in Panama Refining to
combat both accountability-shirking by Congress and impermissible
discretionary excess by the President.
In the modern era, the Court has spent little time and energy policing
the nondelegation doctrine through the intelligible principle analysis.
However, in 1980, the Court had occasion to reconsider the nondelegation
doctrine and ruled in Industrial Union Dept, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute (The Benzene Case)58 that certain provisions of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 197059 did not violate the nondelegation doctrine,
but did so by utilizing a saving construction.6 0 The case dealt with the
complex issue of how the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) was supposed to quantify the exposure risk of benzene for the
purpose of setting permissible levels of benzene in factory air.6 1 OSHA had
interpreted its grant of authority to mean that it could define risk as any risk
of any health issue, without regard to the magnitude of the risk. 62

The

government argued that this language permitted OSHA's interpretation,
therefore allowing it to define the risk of benzene exposure however it saw
fit, define feasibility however it saw fit, and not to restrict in any way the
manner by which OSHA analyzed the risk of exposure to benzene. 63 The
Court reasoned that a statute permitting such broad discretion in the
determination of risk could potentially be broad enough to breach the
nondelegation doctrine; therefore, the statute must be construed to avoid the
question. 64 The Court proceeded to determine that, at least, the statute
required OSHA to quantify the risk of benzene exposure such that OSHA
could "characterize [the risk] as significant in an understandable way." 65 In
doing so, the Court purported that Congress must have meant the statute's
language to require more searching analysis by the delegate, OSHA.
Justice Rehnquist rejected the Court's saving construction, arguing in
concurrence that the statute violated the nondelegation doctrine because it
failed to set forth specific instructions for balancing health risks against
economic feasibility.66 Justice Rehnquist thought that Congress simply
pushed to OSHA the difficult decision of how to quantify risk and
feasibility, rather than having to face the political consequences of making
58. Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S.
607 (1980).
59. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
60. The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 641-46.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 640-41.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 641-46.
65. The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. 607, 641-46 (1980).
66. Id. at 680-82 (RehnquistJ., concurring).
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this inherently unpopular decision.6 7 For Justice Rehnquist, it did not
matter whether OSHA was a constitutionally appropriate recipient because
Congress had not laid down an intelligible principle for OSHA's actions. 68
Justice Rehnquist clearly perceived the issue in Benzene as one of
congressional accountability. 69 He viewed the alleged delegation in Benzene
as an effort by Congress to pass along a difficult judgment to an agency,
rather than accepting the responsibility for regulating benzene through
legislation.70 Since the legislation was incomplete as to the most difficult
issue, an inference emerged that Congress must be attempting to avoid
accountability for its choices by delegating them. Though resolving the
case on Justice Rehnquist's terms required only the intelligible principle
doctrine, he determined additionally that this delegation enlarged the
power of OSHA beyond even the President'sproper authority. 7' While it is
logical that an executive agency's authority cannot be greater than that of
the President above it, one easily can imagine multiple scenarios where
agency authority appears to transcend both congressional and presidential
authority. As noted above, the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine,
ostensibly, is to protect the people from the expansion of overall
government power through respecting checks-and-balances. It follows,
then, that an agency exercising power beyond or different from that of the
President would frustrate checks and balances in an obvious way.
In sum, the intelligible principle analysis has been and is the only explicit
test available to the Court in deciding delegation cases. Like all those
above, a nondelegation case is likely to turn on a court's interpretation of (a)
what Congress wants the delegate to do and (b) whether Congress has given
the delegate adequate criteria under which the delegate can decide what it
supposed to do. Given the complex and often extensive nature of most
regulatory agency statutes and activities, it is at least defensible that the
Court has not, since Panama Refining, found that Congress has simply failed
to supply a course of action and enough criteria for the delegate to
determine when that course of action should or should not be taken.
The cases discussed in Part I represent the clearest and simplest
explanation of the modern nondelegation doctrine and its evolution over
time. Since the focus of this Article is the delegate, Hampton and Clark are
67. See id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that Congress must make hard
choices and exercise the heart of its legislative authority).
68. See id. at 685-87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (outlining the three functions of the
nondelegation doctrine that the legislature failed to meet).
69. See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress was not making law, but
rather making legislators).
70. See id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing the delegation as an attempt by
Congress to avoid making a divisive decision).
71. The Benene Case, 448 U.S. 607, 687-88 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., concurring).
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probably not useful here because they involve a congressional grant of
authority directly to the President.7 2 There is nothing necessarily improper
about authorizing the exercise of the executive power by the head of the
Executive Branch, since the President is accountable directly to the people
for his executive decisions. Further, given the "formulaic" direction, even a
more strictly enforced intelligible principle doctrine would not invalidate
either case because Congress has likely exercised legislative judgment to the
extent necessary to hold Congress accountable to the people, respect
separation of powers, and avoid frustration of checks and balances. Finally,
in neither case did the delegation expand overall government power
through a bypassing of the separation of powers. As for Benzene, one could
argue, as Justice Rehnquist did, that Congress was avoiding accountability
through delegating its tough decisions to OSHA. One could also argue
that delegating to OSHA more power than could even be properly
delegated to the President expands overall government power.7 3 Even so,
as discussed below, OSHA is an agency accountable directly to the
President and may be invested with enough executive authority to be less
useful in demonstrating an analysis of the delegate. Panama Refining, on the
other hand, is probably the only case representative of the strictest
employment of the intelligible principle aspect of the nondelegation
doctrine, but it is not germane to our purposes here for the same reason as
Benzene. The more important insights animating this Article emerge when
viewing the intelligible principle doctrine in combination with a searching
analysis of the delegate. Fortunately, the Court has more than once
evaluated the identity and role of the delegate itself. Indeed, a few
nondelegation landmarks appear to rest on more than just a mere
intelligible principle analysis.
C. CasesDiscussing the InstitutionalNature of the Delegate
OnJanuary 7, 1935, the nondelegation doctrine appeared as a coherent
picture: If Congress wants to regulate subject to the existence of some
circumstance-e.g., when a tariff should apply it must provide specific
actions to be taken under specific circumstances, leaving the executive
official only the discretion to determine when some condition precedent
does, in fact, exist.74 If Congress wants to regulate the management of
federal property, it may determine what its goals for the property's use are,

72. See generallyJ.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
73. Though perhaps only in "creating" theretofore non-existent power and granting it
to an executive agency.
74. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
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and leave only the discretion to determine how the property may be used75
or distributed. 76 In these two legislative contexts, the intelligible principle
analysis fits neatly enough because the simplicity of the subject matter
permits a clear set of policy choices for Congress to develop and prescribe
to the delegate. Furthermore, the would-be delegate always was exercising
or contributing to the exercise of executive authority through the
President-once again, the chief executive.
With this nondelegation
framework in hand, the Court gave nondelegation its second win in A.LA.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.77
Much like the Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry in
Panama Refining,7 8 the subject of Schechter was a Code of Fair Competition for
the sale, processing, and distribution of poultry.79 Under § 3 of NIRA,
industry groups were invited to create Codes of Fair Competition, which
the President could approve under certain conditions.80 The President
could approve a Code, within his discretion, if he determined that the Code
had been created by industry groups "representative" of the relevant
industry and the Code was not anticompetitive, monopolistic, or hostile to
small business. 8' In essence, there were two delegations: one to unnamed
and unknown "industry groups" and one to the President. The industry
groups would determine the prospective rules of conduct, and the President
would "double-check" them before signing them into law.8 2

The Court

divided up the potential delegations in this way and dealt with them in turn.
To begin, it determined that the Codes, regardless of who made them, were
legislative in nature because they prescribed rules of conduct and were
apparently supposed to determine "wise and beneficent" policies for their
given industries.83 According to the Court, such prescription of general
rules of conduct and determinations of the wisdom or benefits of a given
policy course was undoubtedly the province of the Legislative Branch. 84
This analysis is not different from analyses undertaken in the preceding
nondelegation cases: the Court expected Congress to prescribe some action
to be undertaken and under which conditions those actions should be

75. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1911).
76. Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285
(1933).
77. See generally 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (finding the delegation of legislative power
invalid).

78.

293 U.S. 388, 408 (1935).

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Schechter, 295 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 521-23.
Id.
Id.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 535-37 (1935).
Id.
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taken. However, the Court did not stop at the above intelligible principle
analysis. It continued:
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the
rehabilitation

and expansion of their trade or industries? . . . Such a

delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly
inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress. 85
The lack of an intelligible principle troubled the Schechter Court, but the
Court seemed at least equally as troubled by Congress offloading its
authority onto these unidentified trade or industry groups. 86 As private
actors, these groups were not invested with any executive or judicial power
under the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the Court was concerned with how
the people would hold these industry groups accountable. Since they were
neither the President nor an agency invested with any executive authority,
the people's power to hold these groups accountable was almost
nonexistent. Under the intelligible principle analysis, Congress was not
accountable for the legislative judgments, and under an institutional nature
paradigm, the industry groups were not exercising any executive authority
for which the people could hold the President accountable. Finally, no one
harmed by the industry groups' decisions would have effective recourse
because the group was insulated from significant control of either branch.
It might be argued that President's "check" on the industry groups should
be enough to vindicate the principle of accountability embedded within the
nondelegation doctrine. Nonetheless, separation of powers and checks and
balances likely would be frustrated further. Again, the essence of separation
of powers and checks and balances is that the overall power of government
experiences functional, as well as substantive, limits. With or without the
President's imprimatur, the wisdom of a given policy course had been
delegated from Congress to him and these outside groups.
The Court then continued in Schechter to evaluate the authority vested in
the President. Returning to its analysis of the two conditions under which
the President was to accept, reject, or alter a proffered Code, the Court
determined that those two conditions in no way limited the scope of the
President's discretion.87 Again, and just like in Panama Refining, the people
could not have effective recourse against Congress, and overall government
power was enlarged improperly.88

85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 537.
Id.
See id. at 538-39.
See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

ADMmISTRATIVE L WREVIEW

76

[68:1

Carter v. Carter Coal C.89 is the perhaps most direct Supreme Court case
on the nature of the delegate.90 There, the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935 (the Act) directed "the producers of more than two-thirds of the
annual national tonnage production" of coal and employers of "more than
one-half of the mine workers employed" to set wages and hours for the
entire coal mining industry.9 ' The Act, then, directed these unnamed,
private sector coal mining entities to make important and far-reaching rules
for all of their competitors.
This, concluded the Court, "is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an
official or an official body." 9 2 Interestingly, the Carter Court did not even
reference the intelligible principle doctrine, nor did it even discuss the
intelligibility of the delegation." It simply concluded, "The delegation is so
clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is unnecessary to do more
than refer to decisions of this Court which foreclose the question." 94 Like
Schechter, the Court simply refused to allow a non-governmental delegate to
exercise any regulatory authority over its competitors. Note that in Carter,
the Court rested its holding in part on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.95 While this is interesting as a historical matter, procedural
due process has not been a common avenue for nondelegation challenges
to statutes. Though this may be a fruitful question for future debate, the
potential that delegation implicates principles of procedural due process is
beyond the scope of this Article.
In Takus v. United States,96 the Court took occasion to determine whether
Congress's vesting of price-fixing authority in an Office of Price
Administration (OPA) violated the nondelegation doctrine.97
During
World War II, Congress wished to ensure that there was no price-fixing
malfeasance taking place that might further burden Americans during
wartime.98 As such, the OPA was to set prices according to a number of
factors, including pre-war price levels and other factors that might require

89.

298 U.S. 238 (1936).

90. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (highlighting that Congress
delegated to a party "not even ... presumptively disinterested").
91. See id. at 310.
92. Id. at 310-11.
93. See id. at 311 (focusing on the delegation of a government function to private
persons).
94. Id. at 311-12 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 537 (1935)).
95. See id. at 311 (1936); see also U.S. Const amend. V.
96. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
97. See id. at 418-20.
98. See id. at 419-20.
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an increase or decrease in prices for various commodities during the war.99
Applying the intelligible principle analysis, the Court determined that
Congress had prescribed a certain remedy or prophylaxis (the setting of
prices to stop or avoid inflation) and had provided a formula for the OPA
to use when determining exactly how to deploy Congress's prescription. 00
But, once again, the Court did not stop at merely determining that the
intelligible principle analysis had been satisfied. Instead, it distinguished
Schechter on the grounds that, in that case, not only had the intelligible
principle doctrine not been met, but Congress had sought to vest the
authority to create prospective rules of conduct in private individuals who
were not "public official[s] responsible to Congress or the Executive. . . ."o
In essence, the Court was applying the combined accountability principle
discussed above.
In Takus, the Court determined that the intelligible
principle was met and, therefore, that Congress could be held accountable
for legislative judgments. Furthermore, the delegate was properly invested
with executive powers and, thus, accountable to the President. As such, a
person harmed by the OPA's price decisions would have enough recourse
against accountable elected officials for whatever harm these government
actions caused. Perhaps this seems coherent, or perhaps it does not. Either
way, the Court's willingness to consider not only what Congress said, but
also to whom it spoke, is a net positive for the limitation of government
power. In fact, it provides a framework much more useful than arguing
over something as subjective as intelligibility.
As for the modern era, there is one lone dissent that addresses explicitly
the nature and location of the delegate. 0 2 In 1989, the Court decided
Mistretta v. United States, which involved the work of the United States
Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission). 03
The Sentencing
Reform and Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984104 created the
Sentencing Commission to determine sentences for various federal
crimes. 0 5 In Mistretta, the majority dusted off the tried-and-true precedents
06
from Clark to Takus, applying the traditional intelligible principle analysis.
The Court determined that Congress's legislative goal was to sentence
people to the proper amount of time in prison based on certain enumerated
purposes for imprisonment. 0 7 After considering the specific instructions
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 420.
See id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
See id. at 362.
See Pub. L. 98-473, § 991, 98 Stat 1837, 2017 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C § 991).
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368-69.
Id. at 371-74.
See id. at 367 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012)).
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Congress had given to the Sentencing Commission, the Court held that the
nondelegation doctrine did not bar the discretion Congress had granted. 08
The Court rested its holding exclusively on the intelligible principle
analysis, concluding that Congress had indeed cabined the Sentencing
Commission's discretion by stating Congress's goal for the Commission and
by declaring current average sentences as a starting point.1 09 However,
when compared with Schechter and Takus, the Court's opinion was missing
something. Justice Scalia saw the missing piece, dissenting on the grounds
that the dekgate, as opposed to merely the delegation, rendered
unconstitutional the enabling legislative grant to the Sentencing
Commission."1 0 IndeedJustice Scalia even states the instructions Congress
gave to the Sentencing Commission were intelligible on their face-they
give the delegate an idea of what it is supposed to do."' The problem,
according to Justice Scalia, was that Congress was intelligibly telling the
Sentencing Commission to "make law."1 2 Justice Scalia's explanation of the
doctrine can be summarized by a few words from his opinion:
The whole theory of lawful congressional 'delegation' is not that Congress is
sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its responsibility
of making law to someone else; but rather that a certain degree of discretion,
and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action. . . .1t
In short, Justice Scalia's analysis of the nondelegation doctrine is not
only whether or not Congress has provided any constraints on the
discretion of the delegate, but also on the nature of the delegate.11 4 At the
very least, Justice Scalia's framework ties the discretion of the delegate to
the exercise of an independent constitutional power. Justice Scalia believed
that because the Sentencing Commission has no executive or judicial
authority, nor is it exercising the authority of any actor or branch that does,
that its instructions from Congress, intelligible though they were, might
only fairly be instructions to make law."1 5 Justice Scalia might have argued
that a stronger version of the intelligible principle doctrine was not met.
Especially in light of the accountability of Congress, Justice Scalia could
have cited Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Benzene since Congress was leaving
the difficult decision of deciding minimum and maximum sentences to an

108. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
109. Id. at 372-75.
110. See id. at 413-22 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 416 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 417 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 417 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
114. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417-22 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
This concept will be discussed further in Part II, infia.
115. See id. at 420 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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unaccountable delegate, but he chose to discuss the institutional pedigree of
the Sentencing Commission."t6
In 2013, while this Article languished in draft form, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided a case somewhat
similar to Schechter and Carter, Ass'n of American Railroads v. US. Department of
Transportation.117 The D.C. Circuit concluded that a delegation of
regulatory authority to the National Railroad Passenger Corp. (commonly
known as AMTRAK) was unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds.118
The D.C. Circuit based its conclusion substantially on an analysis of
whether AMTRAK was actually a government agency.11 9 Interestingly,
the D.C. Circuit concluded explicitly that "delegating the government's
powers to private parties saps our political system of democratic
accountability." 20 On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit noted that
delegation to private entities is "particularly perilous," since private entities
are seeking private gain rather than pursuing the public interest.121
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the D.C. Circuit 9-0.122 At this
point, one might wonder whether nondelegation really has breathed its last.
Though the author has little choice, he must disagree. The entire issue
with respect to delegation turned upon whether AMTRAK was actually a
government agency. The Court, then, reversed the D.C. Circuit on the
grounds that AMTRAK was a government agency. Such, according to the
Court, was enough to avoid the delegate-based issues emerging from
Schechter and Carter. With just these three cases in mind, it might be
tempting to suggest that the delegate portion of the nondelegation doctrine
merely prohibits Congress from delegating government power outside the
government itself. As a practical matter, perhaps this is the case. This
again raises the question at the heart of this Article: What if the courts had
a more robust doctrine to apply? Could the next case go the other way?
Schechter, Carter, Takus, Mistretta, and Ass'on of American Railroads raised
serious and specific questions about the nature of the delegate itself' 23 In
Schechter and Carter, the Court spilled significant ink decrying the delegation

116. Id.; see also Benzene Case, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). It should be noted, however, that
Justice Rehnquist himself voted in the majority in Mistretta.
117. See 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
118. Id at 668.
119. Id. at 674-76.
120. Id. at 675.
121. Id.
122. See U.S. Dep't of Transp. (DOT) v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
123. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935)
(industry groups); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (Sentencing Commission).

ADMmISTRATIVE L WREVIEW

80

[68:1

of policymaking authority to outside, non-governmental entities.1 24 Indeed,
the Court held that Congress's attempt to utilize such a delegate was
"unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional
prerogatives and duties of Congress." 25 In Takus, too, the Court made
mention of the fact that the Schechter delegates were extra-governmental and
"not . . . responsible" to Congress or the President.1 26 In Mistretta, Justice
Scalia conceded that Congress had articulated an intelligible principle, but
apparently would have held that the Sentencing Commission's absolute
lack of executive or judicial power meant that it was exercising improperly
delegated legislative power.1 27 Justice Scalia's argument rested upon the
inherent powers of the President and the Judiciary. Those powers are
independently constitutional, and, in the case of executive delegates, are
connected to the democratically accountable President. The "junior varsity
Congress" that so bedeviled Justice Scalia was not accountable to any
voters, like the real Congress.128 Furthermore, the Sentencing Commission
was not properly accountable to Congress or the President, who are
properly accountable to criminal defendants and citizens concerned with
how to properly punish (or rehabilitate) criminals. Finally, Ass'n ofAmerican
Railroads turned entirely upon whether AMTRAK was a private company
or a government agency. If it was a government agency, it was more
accountable than the D.C. Circuit might have believed.
Surely, in light of this set of cases stretching across the past eighty years
to the present, the institutional nature of the delegate has some bearing on
whether legislative power has been improperly delegated. Nonetheless, one
could fairly counter that Schechter was a special case because of the
extremely broad delegation and that it-not to mention Panama Refining
should be read in light of the contentious fighting between the President
and the Court over the New Deal. Furthermore, Justice Scalia's dissent in
Mistretta has never caught any traction whatsoever.1 29 And, of course, even
the D.C. Circuit concluded, and the Supreme Court "agreed," that were
AMTRAK a public, rather than private, entity, "the regulatory power it

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
Id.
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413-14 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Id. at 427 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).

129.

Justice Scalia also delivered the majority opinion in IVitman v. American Trucking

Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), holding that Congress had not delegated legislative authority
to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by directing them to set ambient air quality
standards. Id. at 486. However, Justice Scalia may have simply thought that the EPA had
been invested with proper executive authority under the control of the President, and was
therefore accountable to both.
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Arguably, though, there is
still good reason to believe that the Court should be mindful of who is being
authorized, as opposed to just how Congress frames that authorization. In
fact, that is the very gulf that lies between the intelligible principle analysis
and the "private delegate" cases-if democratic accountability and
government power are issues in private delegate cases, why should they not
be considered in public delegate challenges?
II.JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE MODERN POLICY OF THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Judicial enforcement of any doctrine hinges on a court's ability to apply
the doctrine with reasonable certainty and accuracy to any given set of
facts. American public law is filled with complex multipart tests, rules,
standards, and other judicially created decisional techniques. Many of
these doctrines apply to specific types of state or federal law in fact-intensive
circumstances that judges can easily discern.' 3 ' There is no reason the
nondelegation doctrine cannot have its own two-part test: one part testing
whether Congress has provided an intelligible principle and, therefore,
become accountable for its legislative judgments; and another part testing
whether Congress activated some aspect of the delegate's executive or
judicial authority, for which it is accountable to Congress and the President,
who are in turn accountable directly to the people. This Part will discuss
the heretofore fictional "Federal Department of Motor Vehicles," (FDMV)
in hopes that the thought experiment will illustrate the limits of judicial
capacity with respect to the intelligible principle doctrine alone and the
normative judgment that a stronger nondelegation doctrine that includes
an analysis of the delegate is, in itself, sound policy.
A. The Story of the FDMV and the Limits on JudicialCapacity
Imagine a new congressional initiative to license and regulate all drivers
on America's roadways.
Such a statute would authorize a FDMV to
oversee or assist the President in overseeing driver licensing and might
appear in three forms. In the first, Congress announces that age and
driving proficiency are the two criteria for licensing drivers: (1) no one
under sixteen may drive; and (2) no one who cannot demonstrate the use of
an accelerator, brake, turn signal and windshield wiper will get a license.
Congress then directs the FDMV to assist the President in granting licenses
130. Ass'n ofAm. R.Rs. v. DOT, 721 F.3d 666, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
131. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (containing a multi-part
test for discerning whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment).
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to those who meet Congress's criteria. In the second, Congress might
announce that age and driving proficiency are to be of utmost importance
in licensing, authorizing the FDMV to set a driving age and proficiency in
the "public interest, convenience and necessity." 3 2 In the third and most
troublesome case, Congress might authorize the creation of a Licensing
Standards Board (LSB) within, but not under the control of, the FDMV to
set standards for safe and responsible driving that are not unduly
burdensome on drivers whereby the LSB is to first consider the licensing
requirements in place among the several states.133 The FDMV must grant
licenses under whatever conditions the LSB prescribes, and neither the
FMDV nor the President may alter them in any way.
The first case gracefully hurdles the intelligible principle doctrine,
leaving nothing to the FDMV but the determination of how to organize the
queue for taking the test.1 34 The second case, while somewhat concerning,
climbs with little effort over even the early cases because Congress has
cabined the FDMV's discretion to answering two questions. As to the third
and most troublesome case, it might be tempting to argue that the Court
should just strike it down on intelligible principle grounds, 35 but consider
whether or not the above "delegation" is truly unintelligible. Surely, it
could be worse. At least Congress specified "safe," "responsible," and "not
unduly burdensome." Indeed, many proponents of broad delegation would
argue that this is exactly the type of job at which expert administrators are
best; they can perform research, study the driving laws of the several states,
and determine how best to operate a scheme, undoubtedly based on the
"best available evidence."
But for judges, the intelligible principle doctrine alone leaves them very
little with which to work, whether interpreting the statute to avoid the
Constitution or in deciding whether to invalidate the statute on intelligible
principle grounds.1 36 When the delegate has significant room to exercise
discretion and very little statutory limitation, it becomes clear that the
132. Cf Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 274
(1933).
133. Cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding grant to the
Sentencing Commission to determine the appropriate sentences with respect to various
congressional goals).
134. I attribute this example to Professor Stuart Benjamin, as this is his example of a
"detail" that executive agencies are clearly permitted to "fill in" to a broader statutory
scheme.
135. Indeed, Professors Schoenbrod, Lawson, and other supporters of "reviving" the
"old" nondelegation doctrine might very well support this. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 5;
Lawson, supra note 5. In principle, the author may as well.
136. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The debate over
unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a
question of degree.").
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discretion it exercises must be related to independent constitutional
authority. If, like the LSB, the delegate has only the discretion to make
rules but no power to execute them, it is an unaccountable "junior-varsity
Congress," 3 7 exercising legislative authority without the difficulty of
navigating the legislative process and exercising no executive authority for
which the President could be held accountable.
B. The Courts and the Delegate
Politically accountable representatives of the people should enact policy
that affects individual conduct. That way, if the people do not like the
regulatory policies, they can remove the rulemakers at the ballot box. If, on
the other hand, the rulemaker is wholly unconnected from a democratically
accountable person, he or she can make rules with less-or no-regard for
the will of the people. Likewise, the intricate system of separation of powers
and checks-and-balances falls apart when the rulemaker is not subject to
explicit constitutional limitations on its own powers or through rivalry with
other branches.
By explicitly analyzing the institutional nature and
pedigree of the delegate, courts can better police the constitutional principle
of nondelegation.
The intelligible principle doctrine approaches the question of
accountability through what amounts to a reduction analysis. If we
subtract all the discretion left to the delegate, whoever it is, we should
expect to see all of the "most important" decisions resolved in legislation.
However, as mentioned earlier, the intelligible principle doctrine does not
always apply perfectly to all sets of facts. As such, sometimes the Court
might see only a few big decisions made by Congress, but not see so few
that it can justify the employment of the nondelegation doctrine. The
doctrine approaches the question of separation of powers and checks-andbalances in an even less valuable way; that is, the Court will not disturb
delegation where someone from the government is the delegate. 38 The
Court, then, needs to take a closer look at the delegate and ask, "Who is
making the rest of the decisions?"
On the delegate side of the equation, policymaking discretion should be
limited to what is necessary to carry out the major policy preferences
Congress enunciated. When an executive delegate with clear executive
authority is making policy in the process of carrying out Congress's major

137. Id. at 427 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
138.
Because this arguably violates standard separation of powers doctrine-see, for
example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)-it may be
important to note that the nondelegation doctrine is an even worse tool for enforcing
separation of powers directly.
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policy preferences, a court can be generally confident that the policymaking
is ancillary to the delegate's executive duties and not merely legislative. On
the other hand, if the delegate is left only to answer those policy questions
and is entirely or largely separated from the execution of any policy, then
the Court could hold more confidently that the nondelegation principle has
been violated.
C. W40hy Should Anyone Care?
It is a familiar refrain in constitutional law that the twenty-first century is
not the late eighteenth century of the Constitution's framers. Today's
problems are bigger, broader, and more complex, and, in any case, it
makes more sense for government to "work" for the people than to adhere
to rigid formalities.1 39 In his unambiguously titled 1985 work on the
matter, Jerry Mashaw argues that administrators should make political
decisions.1 40 Mashaw's argument essentially represents any modern case
for administrative governance: administrators will simply govern society
more efficiently by reducing "decision, agency, and error costs."'41 Though

Mashaw apparently believes that this is true of all delegation, he further
argues that at least delegation delivers more cost savings than whatever
costs it may impose.1 42
At bottom, democratic self-governance in a constitutional republic such
as the United States is not all about the potential empirical superiority of
one form of decisionmaking over another. Even if broad delegations are
good for "efficient, speedy pursuit of government's goals," 43 it undermines
important constitutional protections of democratic accountability and
limitations on power. What if, perhaps, the government's goals are
different than those of the people? The Constitution's legislative process
carefully arranged the federal legislative powers to protect accountability to
the entirety of the people.1 44 The Constitution also set the powers in rivalry
with one another so as to require substantial cooperation when making
139. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 21 (1998) ("Formalism might be
associated with bright-line rules that seek to place determinate, readily enforceable limits on
public actors.

Functionalism . . . might be associated with . . . seek[ing] to provide public

actors with greater flexibility.").
140. Mashaw, supra note 4.

14 1.

Id. at 92.

142. Id. at 92-93.
143. David Schoenbrod, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1985).
144. Some describe this as protection against "factions."
See David Schoenbrod,
Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The ConstitutionalPurposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36
Am. U. L. REV. 355, 371 (1987).
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rules that affect the lives of many. When Congress delegates its legislative
authority, the protections of the legislative process are diluted and with it
the voice of all of the people. The essence of a system of governance is
discretion; this governmental discretion, in the abstract, can be exercised
for the common good or for the good of whomever the government may
want to benefit. Remove the discretion from a broader set of accountable
parties-that is, Congress or the President-and place it in the hands of
unaccountable administrators, the larger populace loses that voice. 145
Furthermore, total government power expands beyond the checks-andbalances intended to constrain it.
Nonetheless, the author concedes that this issue of accountability is
relatively abstract and it is not necessarily apparent that a stronger
nondelegation doctrine is the answer. However, the author posits that for
anyone serious about constitutional self-government, a stronger judicial
nondelegation doctrine is a necessary component. As one commentator
put it, "The demise of the nondelegation doctrine . . . allows the national
government's . . . legislative powers to be exercised by administrative

agencies," rather than by an accountable Congress.1 46 As the next Part will
show, courts can (and should) do more to police the nondelegation doctrine
and restore some of the lost accountability that has come with its
dormancy.
III. THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL AND THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

As should be clear by this point, the intelligible principle test is, by
nature, difficult to apply. It is simple in the sense that it represents only one
question a court must ask, but it is complex in that intelligibility is
somewhat hard to define over wide and varying circumstances.1 47 This
need not be the end of the story, however. Previous courts have left a
handful of proverbial breadcrumbs: the institutional nature of the delegate
discussed above. This Part will paint in broad strokes a new framework for
analyzing the institutional nature of the delegate and then apply the new
framework to the CFPB and the FSOC, a pair of new species in the
administrative zoo given life in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and

145. See Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Consematism and Administrative
Power, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 295, 297-300 (1987) (discussing the "point of discretion" that has
been relocated from Congress to administrators).
146. Lawson, supra note 5, at 1241.
147. Not to mention that the very word "intelligible" suggests "unintelligibility" as its
opposite. Despite any shortcomings or unpopularity of Congress, it would be rather difficult
to describe any given piece of its handiwork as "unintelligible."
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Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).1 48
A. The InstitutionalNature Paradigm
As discussed above, the Schechter and Takus courts, along with Justice
Scalia's dissent in Mistretta, all express discomfort with a delegate who
possesses little or no independent authority or any government power at all.
Such a delegate would be neither executive nor judicial, although it could
be said to reside in either branch.1 49 Let us return to our example
regarding federal driver licensing above in order to analyze the nature of
the third delegate, which is not like the other two. The first delegate is
ultimately and explicitly the president; the FDMV is only there to assist him
in carrying out his duty to hand out licenses. The second delegate is the
FDMV, which, like some other well-known agencies, has significant
executive authority, such as handing out licenses and testing drivers.
Indeed, many congressional directions to the Environmental Protection
Agency and agencies of its kind are not only intelligible but also quite
direct; as such, some policymaking will be necessary in order to carry out
Congress's specific demands. It simply carries out the directions that
Congress has required it to perform, much like the President would were he
the explicit delegate.150 The third, though, is the ugly duckling; it does not
exercise any executive power over driver licensing it does not even decide
how to arrange the queue. The LSB merely determines all the relevant
standards for granting a driver license, and the President or FDMV must
grant licenses to whoever meets the LSB's criteria. Nonetheless, the grant
of authority to promote "safe and reasonable driving" and to "look to the
licensing standards of the several states" are probably enough to wiggle
over the intelligible principle doctrine in its current form.' 5' However, if
the Court critically analyzed the institutional pedigree of the LSB, it could
fairly conclude that this delegate was doing nothing more than exercising
kgislative authority under an improper delegation. Indeed, since the LSB is
completely divorced from any inherent executive (or judicial) authority, it
might only be said to be legislating.
Comparing and contrasting the FDMV and the LSB should bring the
institutional nature paradigm to life. The FDMV, as described above, is a
148.

12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-641 (2012).

149. Cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368-70 (1989) (noting that, under 28
U.S.C. § 991 (a) (2012), the Sentencing Commission is in the Judicial Branch).
150. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 402 (1928)
(describing the role of administrators in "assist[ing] the President" in carrying out his
statutory duties).
151. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407-08 (stating that separation of powers anticipates
communication between the branches on matters of overlapping interest).
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"classical" executive agency.
Its organic statute directs it to do very
"executive" things.
It is charged with administering the testing and
licensing of millions of drivers in the United States. As mentioned above, it
must test people, print the licenses, and pass them out. The LSB, on the
other hand, is directed only to sit in a room and make rules. It does not
hand out licenses, it does not test people, and it does not organize local
DMV offices or any other "executive" activity. Like in Mistretta, the
intelligible principle doctrine alone would not "catch" the LSB because the
bar it raises is so low.' 5 2 However, if a court critically examined the nature
of the delegate and its statutory purpose, it would find nothing to execute or
adjudicate. It would only be weighing certain policy choices and making
rules that govern individual conduct. As such, it is legislating, a power
which is reserved only to Congress.
At this juncture, some might question the need for putting a stop to the
LSB. After all, the LSB is within the government 53 and probably has a
number of competitive advantages over a traditional executive agency in
setting licensing standards.1 54 Even better, this would allow the FDMV to
use its resources on other prerogatives. As appealing as those things are,
the LSB is acting as a "junior-varsity Congress," making legislative rules but
without having to face constituents or the public recording of their
decisionmaking process. 5 5 In addition, the LSB is not even exercising
executive authority under the control of the President; in fact, it is actually
directing the traditionally executive actors. This is undoubtedly the province
of Congress, the body who is accountable to the people for its directions.
Since the LSB's executive function is non-existent, it is not accountable to
the people through the President. Finally, if a citizen is denied a license due
to the LSB's ruling, he cannot hope to seek recourse, since the LSB's
accountability apparently is to no one.
B. A New Analytical Framework
By this point, it is clearly understood that the intelligible principle is
about how much guidance Congress has given the delegate, or, put another
way, how much Congress has cabined the delegate's discretion.
The
institutional nature paradigm above would measure how much executive or

152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944) (acknowledging that the
congressional exercise of power and the formation of administrative guidelines for the Office
of Price Administration established it as part of the government).
154. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 144, at 371-85.
155. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(questioning the constitutionality of a non-congressional body having no governmental
powers other than promulgating rules with the force of law).
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judicial authority the delegate possesses independent of the specific policyrelated authority granted by Congress. When viewed through the prism of
delegation plus delegate, as opposed delegation only, the nondelegation test
becomes easier to manage. Furthermore, this addition to the test does not
upset the current regulatory apple cart in a drastic or extreme way.
Consider the following framework, described in terms of different ordered
pair scenarios.
In Scenario I, the guidance from Congress is high and the delegate is the
President or a delegate with well-established executive power. 56 This is the
scenario to which "no valid objection can be made." 57 Indeed, this is
exactly what most people would desire from Congress. In Scenario II,
Congress has again provided a relatively high degree of guidance, but has
left all of the guidance to a delegate with little or no independent power.
The relevant question might become "how is a public delegate with no
independent power substantially different than a private delegate with no
government power?" 58 Scenario III is merely the inverse of Scenario II: a
delegate with well-defined executive or judicial power and with a very
broad grant of authority. Finally, Scenario IV involves a broad and
ambiguous grant of authority to a delegate with little or no ancillary power.
With this framework in hand, a court could apply a two-part test that
includes the traditional intelligible principle doctrine and the new
institutional nature paradigm. Scenario I merits little discussion since it
largely represents a well-functioning system of governance as envisioned by
the formal structure of the Constitution. Congress is accountable for the
legislative decisions that it made, the President is accountable for the
executive decisions that he or she made, and the citizen knows who to
blame for any adverse consequences. Scenario II could be invalidated
under the institutional nature paradigm because the delegate has no
executive authority. If the delegate has no authority to do anything but
study evidence and set policy, then the Court could hold that it is making
law, unaccountable to the people. Scenario III presents a circumstance
where the Court would probably not invalidate the law as an
unconstitutional delegation because the Court could look at the executive
role and powers of the delegate and determine that the agency's

156. E.g., Mashaw, supra note 4, at 93-94 (stating that the EPA has plenary enforcement
authority to execute Congress's environmental enactments).
157. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
158. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. DOT, 721 F.3d
666, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2013), rev'd, DOT v. Ass'n of Am. RRs., 135 S.Ct. 1225 (2015)
(discussing the unconstitutionality of a congressional delegation of legislative power to
private entities).
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policymaking was connected with the enforcement and implementation
powers of the delegate. Scenario IV, though, is exactly the circumstance in
which the Court currently has to choose between upsetting the apple cart
by expanding the intelligible principle doctrine again or simply allowing a
broad delegation to stand. If the Court had another question to ask, it
could invalidate the law because the delegate is not exercising executive
authority and, therefore, must be exercising legislative authority committed
to Congress.
In short, this test gives courts another avenue to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine. If Congress grants significant powers to a given
delegate, the Court need not only apply the weaker intelligible principle
doctrine; it can investigate and analyze the nature of the delegate to
determine whether or not Congress has improperly delegated its legislative
authority. Furthermore, in evaluating the delegate and what executive or
judicial power it may also rightfully possess, it can better determine which
powers Congress is directing it to exercise.
C. Applying the New Test: The FinancialStability Oversight Council and the Consumer
FinancialProtectionBureau
At the time of this writing, litigants have already initiated an action
challenging the constitutionality of Dodd-Frank on nondelegation
grounds.1 59 The primary challenges are to the FSOC and the CFPB. The
case is the perfect opportunity to illuminate the usefulness of the new test,
as well as any potential weaknesses in the construction or application of the
test.
The FSOC is a new standing committee that is central to Dodd-Frank's
60
regulatory scheme.o
The committee consists of a group of heads of other
federal financial regulatory agencies, and they sit on the FSOC in their
capacities as heads of the other agencies.1 6' The FSOC's primary function
is "to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could
arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of
large, inter-connected bank holding companies or nonbank financial
companies, or that could arise outside the financial services
marketplace." 6 2 However, the peculiar aspect of the FSOC's authority is
that it does not have any independent enforcement authority; it can only
recommend and direct other financial regulatory agencies to act in

159.
160.
161.
162.

See State Nat'1 Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
Id.
Id. § 5322(a)(1)(A).
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accordance with its determinations.1 63 Furthermore, it has the authority to
designate systemically important financial institutions and recommend that
the relevant regulatory authorities regulate these institutions.1 64
In
summary, the FSOC is charged with defining financial stability, identifying
risks to financial stability, and then recommending solutions to those risks
to the other regulatory agencies charged with enforcing financial law.
The CFPB is somewhat different in that it is more or less a new organ for
exercising all previously existing consumer protection enforcement
authority of financial regulatory agencies. 65 Its primary grant of authority
is "to implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial
law

consistently

for .

.

. ensuring"

access

to

"fair,

transparent,

and

competitive" financial markets. 6 6 The CFPB has significant rulemaking
authority that it exercises according to factors and considerations, including
cost-benefit analysis to consumers of financial products.16 7
The CFPB has significant enforcement, investigation, and executive
authority, therefore functioning similarly to other regulatory agencies.
Indeed, as mentioned above, the CFPB is essentially a new owner of
significant pre-existing financial regulatory authority, along with a huge
new grant of almost plenary authority over financial regulation.
In applying the new test articulated above, we begin with the FSOC.
Surely, the instruction to merely assess systemic risk across the entire
financial economy and decide which entities are systemically important is
an extremely broad grant with very little guidance. Nonetheless, one can
almost hear a court scratching its head over how to apply the intelligible
principle doctrine alone to the FSOC and questioning whether it really
wants to interfere with this new regulatory methodology. However, since
the intelligible principle question is hanging in the balance, our new test
permits us to turn to the institutional nature of the FSOC. Though the
FSOC is comprised of individuals who exercise well-established executive
authority for their own agencies, the FSOC itself has little. It is merely a
roving entity that defines risks to the financial system and recommends
ways to mitigate those risks-that is, it recommends ways to regulate the
Clearly, the FSOC's
system to the other regulatory agencies. 68
policymaking function is "divorced" from any executive power.1 69 Its

163. Id. §§ 5322(a)(2)J)-(K).
164. Id.
165. § 5491 (a).
166. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012).
167. Id. § 5512(a)-(b)(2)(A)(ii).
168. Id. § 5322.
169. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419 (1989) (Scalia,
(stating that any delegation of legislative power is unacceptable).

J.,

dissenting)

2016]

TOWARD A JUDICIALLY-MANAGEABLE NODELEGA TIONJDOCTRDVE

91

policymaking authority is not merely necessary to carry out any other
important congressional policy directive; its authority is Congress's
directive. Put somewhat differently, the FSOC is ultimately acting like a
miniature legislature. It is making policy judgments and directing other
executive agencies to execute those choices. As such, a court faced with
analyzing the FSOC under this Article's new nondelegation analysis could
hold fairly, and with substantial basis, that the absolute non-existence of
executive authority the FSOC possesses violates the nondelegation
doctrine. After this assessment, it is clear that the FSOC is not executive
and accountable to the President and can only be thought to be making
rules and determinations constitutionally committed to Congress.
The CFPB, on the other hand, is closer. In fact, it presents itself more as
a Scenario III case. Congress has given very little in the way of real
guidance; it has only directed the CFPB to consider a few vague factors
such as the "reduction of access by consumers" and the effect of regulations
on "consumers in rural areas." 170 However, the CFPB is granted significant
authority to enforce and execute both new and preexisting consumer
protection laws.171 On one hand, the CFPB's grant of rulemaking authority
and factors to look for are far from the typical grant of rulemaking
authority to agencies with plenary executive powers. 72 Indeed, the CFPB's
primary function is not making financial regulatory policy alone, but
executing and enforcing Congress's past and present declarations of
financial regulatory policy. This compare-and-contrast between the CFPB
and FSOC are very similar to the above discussion of the FDMV and LSB.
One delegate is charged with carrying out or administering a statutory
scheme, which necessitates certain limited policymaking.
The other
delegate is charged with making rules for another entity, which will then
carry out its instructions.
The former is acceptable under this new
formulation of the nondelegation doctrine, while the latter is Congress's
constitutional duty.
CONCLUSION

The nondelegation doctrine has had a long, peculiar, and storied life. It
may or may not actually be dead, but even if it is, it may require but one
missing piece to bring it back to life. This Article's new formulation of the
nondelegation doctrine and new analytical test for applying it would offer

170. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A).
171. Id.§5512(a)-(b)(1).
172. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001); The Benzene
Case, 448 U.S. 607, 611-15 (1980) (demonstrating that the broad grant of powers to an
agency are often found in statutory language).
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courts and litigants an opportunity to police more effectively the line
between legislative power, executive power, and judicial power, while not
necessarily disturbing some of the more popular and well-established
frameworks for administrative government. Again, the purpose of this
Article was to determine whether or not the nondelegation doctrine could
be reformulated in such a way that a judge could actually rely on it, not an
attempt to dismantle the administrative state through the courts.
Ultimately, time will tell whether the courts have any interest in utilizing a
true nondelegation doctrine, or whether they are content with applying it in
its hypothesized canonical form or with the status quo of non-enforcement.
Either way, the constitutional principles of separation of powers and
nondelegation are fundamental to the protection of ordered liberty in our
constitutional system. But these protections are in jeopardy without robust,
coherent, and consistent judicial application of the nondelegation doctrine.
To give effect to the nondelegation doctrine, courts should begin analyzing
who is getting to exercise grants of authority from Congress, instead of just
whether Congress has granted authority intelligibly.

